3. I. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. . . , : . , . , . : . . 1 3. II. 1. 2.
3. 4. 5. 6. . . . . . . . 2 3. III. 1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6. . . . . ? vs. . 3 3.1.1. 1.
2. : ; ; ; ; ; .. : ; . 4 3.1.2. , : : , , . B , : 2 B B
B B Q , 0, 0 (3.1) 2 Q : Q 2 C C C C Q , 0, 0 2 Q Q (3.2) 5 3.1.2. , :
: B Q C Q : O B B Q B Q C Q (3.4) B B C 0 Q Q Q (3.3) B C
Q 1 Q (3.5) (3.6) 6 3.1.2. , : , , : B C Q Q (3.7) , >0.
(3.6) B/Q
. 3.1: B aQ bQ 2 C cQ dQ 2 (3.8) (3.9) , MB a 2bQ (3.10) MC c 2dQ (3.11) , , , =: 2 2 (3.12)
aQ bQ cQ dQ 9 3.1.2. , : : a c * QB (3.13) bd , : a c * (3.14) MBB a 2b bd a c * MC B c 2d bd
(3.15) MB MC a 2bQ c 2dQ (3.16) 10 3.1.2. , : a c * QS (3.17) 2 b d . 3.1 F 1
a c a c2 (3.18) S E a c 2 2 b d 4 b d 1 * * S F MC MB QB QS 2 2 (3.19) 1 c a c a c a 2a 2c 2 2 b d 4 b d
11 3.1.2. , : ( BS . 3.1) , , , , QS, , BS=0. : a MB a 2bQ 0 QB (3.20) 2b 12 3.1.2. , :
: 2bc a c , a b d b d QB a 2 bc , a 2b b d (3.21) 13 P 3.1.3. ,
3.2. UB3 S T UB1 0 a c 2 b d V a c bd UB2 Q 14 3.1.3. , :
. : 1 1 (3.22) U 1Y P Y , P ( , , ..). 2 2 (3.23) Y Q B C 3 P 3Q B C 3 2 (3.24) 15 3.1.3. ,
(B-C) . (3.22), (3.23) (3.24): U Q : B C 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 3 12 13 (3.25) (3.26) (3.27) (3.28) 16
3.1.3. , (3.8) (3.9): B C a c Q b d Q (3.29) (3.29) (3.25), : U Q 2 a c Q b d Q 2 (3.30) (. 3.1): a c 2 b d *
QB (3.31) 17 3.1.3. , =0: 1 a c * QB (3.32) 2 bd =0: a c * QB bd (3.33) 18
3.1.4. , . , QZ ( BZ). Umin Z , . , S. , , S , . 19 3.1.4. , . P 3.3.
B E O S Z O E S QS QO Umax Z Umin QZ B Q 20 3.1.5. : 1. 2. 3. : ,
. . , . 21 3.1.5. : , , ( ) : (3.34) B PQ Q=f(P).
: B Q (3.35) P Q P P 0 P Q 1 Q P (3.36) 22 3.1.5. : 3.4. P 1 PH CH
1 P1 1 QH Q1 CL Q 23 3.1.5. : CL (. . 3.4), P1, =1. CH>P1, , ,
. P>C/Q, , . : (3.37) O B P , () />0. 24 3.1.5. : : : O Q Q P
P P P (3.38) P Q 1 Q P P (3.39) BC(Q), , P1 , . , . 25 3.1.6. : dI B I e , 0, I e I e (3.40)
IB B B 1 B 2 de dI S (3.41) I S I S e , 0, I S e1 I S e2 de IB IS , ; e ; e1 e2 . 26 3.1.6. 1 , 2
I2. I1: 1 I1RE E I1 r E I1 Var I1 (3.42) 2 r(I) : U' ' I r I U' I (3.43) 27 3.1.6.
: ., . (1999), , , , 2- .., : , .1, .7. , 1 , : 1 E I1 I 2 r E I1 Var I1 (3.44) 2 28 3.1.6. , ( , -). Lindsay, Cotton M. (1976 ), A Theory of Government Enterprise, 84(5) Journal of Political Economy, 1061-1078.
, . Peltzman, Sam (1973 ), An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 196 2 Drug Amendments, 81(5) Journal of Political Economy, 1049-1091. 29 3.1.6. , . Dvila, Alberto, Pagn, Jos A., and Grau, Montserrat Viladrich (1999 ), Immigration Reform, the INS, and the Distribution of In
terior and Border Enforcement Resources, 99(3/4) Public Choice, 327-345. 30 4.2.6. 71 . 5 , . 10 . 56 ,
. .: Mueller, Dennis C. (2003), Public Choice III, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 16. 31 3.2.1. ( ) (rent seeking)) , , ( ) . 32 3.2.1. 3.5. P PM R P
L MC Q 33 3.2.1. 1. 2. 3. , : ( , ) ; , ;
. 34 3.2.2. n n j 1 I J , Ij j- . i fi I i (3.45) i Ii n f j I j j 1 i/Ii>0. 35 3.2.2.
(fi(Ii)=Iri), : Ir R I E G I r T (3.46) r T j i I j 36 3.2.2. : rI
r 1 r R I T rI r 1 r I R 2 I r T 1 0 (3.47) , : rR rR
1 nI n 2 I (3.48) n 1 I rR (3.49) n 2 37 3.2.2. r1, . I (3.49) (3.46),
R n 1 (3.50) rR 0 2 n n n r n 1 (3.51) 38 3.2.2. 2, 1
nI rR rR 2 n n : nI n 1 r R n (3.53) 39 3.2.2. : nI
lim R r n (3.54) r<1 . r=1 ( ) 1/2nI/R1. , 1
10 50 100 1000 0,10 98 97 96 96 95 95 95 0,20 95 94 93
92 91 91 91 0,50 88 85 83 82 81 81 81 1,00 76 74 72
70 70 69 69 5,00 32 34 35 36 36 36 36 10,00 18 21 22
23 24 24 24 * Hillman, Arye L. and Katz, Eliakim (1984), Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power, 94(373) Economic Journal, 104-110. 41 3.2.3. 1. : , . Baik, Kyung Hwan and Shogren, Jason F. (1995), CompetitiveShare Group Formation in Rent-Seeking Contests, 83(1/2) Public Choice, 113-126. 2.
, ; Nitzan, Shmuel (1991), Collective Rent Dissipation, 101(409) Economic Journal, 1522-1534. 42 3.2.4. V , ; UR , ; UC , : V V V V U R ,U C , 0, 0 (3.56) U R U C , U R R , U C K R L ,
R R P , L L P (3.57) , . 43 3.2.4. , : V V R V R V L (3.58) P U R P U C P
U C P 0 V R V U R P U C R L P P (3.59) 44 3.2.4. , R/ P / V/UC , (3.59). V/UC>0, , R/P=0 (, ,
(3.59) 0), (3.59) 0. 45 3.2.5. 3.6. P S A E C P S H B P F G Q D Q Q
46 3.2.6. 3.7. x2 A B C E D U1 U2 U3 B A x1 47 3.2*
Krueger (1974) 1964 7% Krueger (1974) 1968 15% () Posner (1975) 3% () Cowling and Mueller (1978) 19631966
13% ( ) Cowling and Mueller (1978) 19681969 7% ( ) 48 3.2* Ross (1984) 1980
38% () Mohammad and Whalley (1984) 19801981 25-40% Laband and Sophocleus (1988) 1985 50% Lopez and Pagoulatos (1994) 1987 12,5%
* : Mueller, Dennis C. (2003), Public Choice III, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 355. 49 Cowling, Keith and Mueller, Dennis C. (1978), The Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 88(352) Economic Journal, 727-748. Krueger, Anne O. (1974), The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64(3) American Economic Review, 291-303. Laband, David N. and Sophocleus, John P. (1988), The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking: First Estimates, 58(3) Public Choice, 269-275. Lopez, Rigoberto A. and Pagoulatos, Emilio (1994), Rent Seeking and the Welfare Cost of Trade Barriers, 79(1/2) Public Choice, 149-160. Mohammad, Sharif and Whalley, John (1984), Rent Seeking in India: Its Costs and Policy Significance, 37(3) Kyklos, 387-413. Posner, Richard A. (1975), The Social Costs of Monopoly and
Regulation, 83(4) Journal of Political Economy, 807-827. Ross, V.B. (1984), Rent-Seeking in LDC Import Regimes: The Case of Kenya, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Discussion Paper in International Economics, No 8408. 50 3.3.1. : . 51 3.3.1. 3.8.
52 3.3.2. 3.9. P P B MC D MR Q1 Q2 Q 53 3.3.2. 3.10. P P+B MC
P D MR Q2 Q1 Q 54 3.3.3. 3.11. A M B C N 0 L 100% 55 3.3.3.
. , N : N1 P N 1 y y (3.60) y . N : 1 (3.61) E N y 56 3.3.3. i- : li
(3.62) i i b y b ; ((b)<0); l . : (3.63) D D b , y 57 3.3.3. : : y D b , y b f y
(3.64) db 1 D y f ' y dy Db (3.65) Db<0, 1- Dy <>=0. t: V t w max b c U t , V t 1 (3.66) 58 3.3.3. w , c ; =1/(1+r)
. (3.67) U t 1 p V t 1 p y V t 1 B 1 y S p ; y ; B ; S . S=B=b (V(t)=V U(t)=U t). 59 3.3.3. 3.12. (p) (1-py)) C V w
( ( V C w c 1-pp y)) 1 ) C w c b V V 1 N
w 1 60 c 3.3.3. (. 3.2): V C w b1 p c 1 1 p 1 y : V
C V N (3.68) (3.69) (. 3.2): pw1 y 1 p b c r (3.70) 61 3.3.3. , : pw1 y F F 1 p b
r (3.71) : pw1 y y F 1 p b r b f y (3.72) 62 3.3.3. , :
1 p f 1 cmax (3.73) pw 1 p f 0 cmin r (3.74) , : 63 3.3.3. y, F 3.13. y F[(1-p)b1-pw(1-y)/r] F[(1-p)b-pw(1-y)/r] 1 F[(1-p)b2-pw(1-y)/r] 0 yt y1 yx y2 yk
y3 yz 1 y 64 3.3.3. 3.14. b D(b,y2) 0 E(y) L b1 b2 H D(b,y1) yt y1 yx y2 yk y3 yz
1 y 65 3.3.4. ? , , , , . .. , . ( ). 66 3.3.4. ?
ek () k: (3.75) ek hk s bk hk ( ) ; s(bk) : sb>0, sbb<0. k: R k g) ek k bk (3.76) k k ; 0
: g) hk ,bk k sb bk 1 (3.77) dbk g) ee sb 0 dhk g) ee s 2 g) e sbb b (3.78) (. 3.3): , : (3.79) * max * b hk ; b hk hkmaxbk min ; hk*
. 68 3.3.4. ? : * * dek dhk * sb bk * * dbk dbk (. 3.4): * dek g) e sbb
0 * g) ee sb dbk (3.80) (3.81) . 69 3.3.4. ? (5%) (regulatory intervention), (regulatory discretion) , (time wasted),
. .: Kaufman, Daniel and Wei, Shang-Jin (1999), Does "Grease Money" Speed up the Wheels of Commerce?, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WPS 2254. 70 3.3.5. vs. , - . , , : x1 (3.82) MR1 MR2 MC1 x2 71
3.3.5. vs. x1 x2 , MR1 MR2 , MC1 . (dx1/dx2>0), (MR1
3.3.6. 3.16*. 74 3.3.6. 3.17*. * Paldam, Martin (2002), The Cross-country Pattern of Corruption: Economics, Culture and the Seesaw Dynamics, 18(2) European Journal of Political Economy, 215-240. 75 3.3.6. 1;
2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; .. 76 3.3.6. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Mauro, Paolo (1995), Corruption and Growth, 110(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 681-712; Wei, Shang-Jin (2000), How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?, 82(1) Review of Economics & Statistics, 1-11; Wei, Shang-Jin and Wu, Yi (2001), Negative Alchemy? Corruption,
Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises, NBER Working Paper, 8187; Tanzi, Vito and Davoodi, Hamid (2000), Corruption, Growth, and Public Finances, IMF Working Paper, 00/182; Tanzi, Vito and Davoodi, Hamid (1997), Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth, IMF Working Paper, 97/139; Gupta, Sanjeev, Davoodi, Hamid, and Alonso-Terme, Rosa (2002), Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?, 3(1) Economics of Governance, 23-45; Gupta, Sanjeev, de Mello, Luiz, and Sharan, Raju (2001), Corruption and Military Spending, 17(4) European Journal of Political Economy, 749-777. 77
