# Prisoners' dilemma - Patrick McNutt

PRISONERS DILEMMA Co-operate or cheat: beyond individual choice In a game of imperfect information, players do not know game dimension, players are simply unaware of the actions chosen by other players. However if they know the other players type information is complete. In incomplete information games, players may or may not know some information about the other players - their type, their strategies, payoffs or their preferences but they have beliefs. Binary Preference Cooperate Reward No Reward Compete Punished

Not Punished Binary Preference Cooperate 1st preference ? Compete 4th preference ? PAYOFFS REFLECT PREFERENCE ORDER. GUARANTEED A 2 BUT THERE IS AN ELUSIVE 3 WHAT IF? STRATEGY I: COOPERATE

WHAT IF? STRATEGY II: COMPETE. THEN IF STRATEGY I IS THE CONSENSUS..? Strategy I Strategy II Strategy I 2,2 0,3 Strategy II 3,0 1,1 Nash Equilibrium WINNING IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF MOVES TRUST 8 Moves =

CHEAT 8 Moves = Move 1 = Rival Move 1 = Move 1 = Rival Move 1 = Move 2 = Rival Move 1 = Move 2 = Rival Move 2 = After 2 moves After 2 moves Move 3 = Rival Move 1 = Move 3 = Rival Move 3 = After 3 moves After 3 moves Move 4 = Rival Move 1 =

Move 4 = Rival Move 4 = Move 5 = Rival Move 1 = Move 5 = Rival Move 4 = Move 6 = Rival Move 1 = Move 6 = Rival Move 4 = Move 7 = Rival Move 1 = Move 7 = Rival Move 4 = Move 8 = Rival Move 1 = Move 8 = Rival Move 4 = THIEF OF NATURE Cheating on 2nd move after signalling trust on 1st move delivers 2 moves Short-term gain 2 moves > 2 moves

Indifference with thief of nature. Opponent likewise with I-think-You think-I-think and punishes the cheater for breaking trust. If knowledge of 8 moves then Shortterm gain < Long Term Benefit B (A,B) A Reciprocal Altruism Reciprocal Altruism 1st Preference Pro-active No Regrets Tough commitment & Trust Prisoners Dilemma ? Descartes Game Change

A lags behind, Costly Altruism for B unsustainable unilateral ? A Prisoners Dilemma 4th Preference Descartes Game Change B lags behind, Costly Altruism for A unsustainable unilateral Reactive Conflict All bets are off the table TRUST & COMMITMENT Co-operate

cheat Co-operate cheat 2,2 Kantian equilibrium 0,3 3,0 1,1 Nash equilibrium alliance No alliance alliance 2,2

Payoffdominant 0,1 No alliance 1,0 1,1 Play Games of Strategic Interaction The Prisoners Dilemma Conflict Trust & Commitment nflict & The Prisoners Dilemma Truhttp://ncase.me/trust/ http://www.patrickmcnutt.com/kaelo/kaelo.html

## Recently Viewed Presentations

• Julie Ruel, agente de planification, programmation et recherche ... Ruel et Julien-Gauthier, 2009-2012) Carte routière pour soutenir une transition de qualité des enfants EHDAA vers le préscolaire (Bourdeau, Moreau, Ruel 06-09). Les savoirs en partage entre les acteurs en réseau...
• Networks: Fast Ethernet LLC MAC Convergence Sublayer Media Dependent Sublayer Media Independent Interface Data Link Layer Physical Layer MII Concept facilitated by 10Mbps/100Mbps Adapter Cards Gigabit Media Independent Interface (GMII) (optional) Media Access Control (MAC) full duplex and/or half duplex...
• Training impact evaluations gauge the effect of the training on workers' ability to participate in safety and health activities in the workplace. Training impact evaluations are typically conducted three to six months after the training and could be conducted by...
• Circuit, State Diagram, State Table Circuits with Flip-Flop = Sequential Circuit Circuit = State Diagram = State Table State Minimization Sequential Circuit Design
• A cross yields a corn cob with 705 blue and 224 yellow kernels (blue>yellow). What is the genotype of the parents? (Or, what cross yielded these results?)
• Caldicott. Principles. Justify the purpose(s) Don't use personal confidential data unless it is absolutely necessary. Use the minimum necessary personal confidential data. Access to personal confidential data should be on a strict need-to-know basis. Everyone with access to personal confidential...
• HW1-PR3. Exercise 11 on page 86, but with the following modifications: instead of using U.S. currency, write your program for the Euro. Note that Euro coins come in different denominations from U.S. coins; there are 8 that you must account...
• A Framework for Global Competitiveness Confluence/convergence of technologies - vertical disciplines are important, but lines are blurring Perceived weakness is actually a strength - MN not "super strong" in any one vertical, but "very good" in many Elements of a...