Game Design: Memory & Emotions in Neotenic Data Patterns Patrick A. McNutt, FRSA www.patrickmcnutt.com Follow on Twitter @tuncnunc Visiting Fellow, Manchester Business School, UK & Smurfit Business School, Dublin, Ireland. March 2019 Presentations in Hong Kong and Singapore under auspices of Manchester Business School Note: Work in Progress Slides 28-36 1. Link to meso:data 2018 ppts go to webpage and scroll News & Commentary http://www.patrickmcnutt.com/news/meso-data-omega-circles-origami-manifolds/

2. Copy of pdf Something Abstract is Thinking now available on the web page also. It is the narrative behind these preliminary ppt slides: www.patrickmcnutt.com Modules available www.patrickmcnutt.com 1. Strategy & Competition at Manchester Business School introduces online transaction costs and non-cooperative game theory 2. Business Economics at Smurfit Business School introduces a winning unbeatable strategy set 3. Masterclass on Cognitive Business Strategy introduces thinking about thinking

mistake-proofing strategy http://www.patrickmcnutt.com/news/game-ontology/ Onsumer behaviour Weintroducetheonsumer:onlineconsumer outsourcingmemoryisa dominantstrategy 1.FOMO 2.Rational onsumersinterpretmissinginformationintheworstpossibleway. 3.Rationalonsumersacquirea gameDNA asthey bidagainstthemselves ala fictionalstoryofRalphsPrettyGoodGrocery 4.Lossaversionforconsumerreplacedby changeaversion foronsumer referstoarational individualspreferencetoembracetangiblegains(ofroboticandmachinelearning)while concedingintangiblelosses (ofdatamemoryandindividualsovereignty) =>

LawofOnePriceViolated BINprice

Hegazy-McNutt Non-linear thinking image time continuum.. Count the Number of F FINISHED FILES ARE THE RESULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF YEARS In our strategy sessions we introduce a dominant strategy: a strategy that is better than another strategy for one player, no matter how the rival plays examples of dominant strategy with an ethical dimension

1. plea bargaining confess v cooperate 2. pricing games price compete v cartel outsourcing of personal data is a dominant strategy Dominant Strategy to compete Compete or Co-operate? Dominant Strategy and Nash equilibrium solution Company B: Company A: Company B: Co-operate (High Price)

Compete (Low Price) 2: 2 0:3 3: 0 1:1 Co-operate (High price) Company B: Compete (Low price)

Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium Binary Preferenc e Cooperate Reward No Reward Compete

Punished Not Punished Binary Preferenc e Cooperate 1st preference ?

Compete 4th preference ? Thief of Nature Cheating on 2nd move after signalling trust on 1st move delivers 2 moves Short-term gain 2 moves > 2 moves Indifference with thief of nature.Lake Wobegon effect

Opponent likewise with I-think-You think-I-think and punishes the cheater for breaking trust. If knowledge of N moves then Short-term gain < Long Term Benefit We take 6 moves = cuboid with 6 faces Apply Eulers number Note: A game of 16 moves but type is betrayed by the 6 th move. 6/16 = 0.375 Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery is Lake Wobegon's grocery store, owned by the eponymous Ralph. The store's motto is: "If you can't find it at Ralph's, you can get along (pretty good) without it.

Lake Wobegon is a fictional town created by Garrison Keillor in his 1970s weekly radio show A Prairie Home Companion. The Lake Wobegon effect is to overestimate ones capabilities, onsumers believe that they are above average and will secure the best price or deal online. Corollary: Thief of Nature & Lake Wobegon effect in sequencing moves: If knowledge of N moves then Short-term gain < Long Term Benefit We take 6 moves = cuboid with 6 faces Apply Eulers number 0.375

Note: A game of 16 moves but type is betrayed by the 6 th move. 6/16 = 0.375 Sequencing moves so that. Corollary: G1: 4th move in a 11th-12th move sequence v G2: 4th move in a 10th-11th move sequence S, type betrayed on 4th move. 4/S 0.375 At a Proustian moment in time 1. Would you prefer to eat in a virtual restaurant with no kitchen or in a restaurant with a kitchen? YES NO 2. Would you prefer a virtual surgeon or a consultant to operate on you? YES NO

3. Would you give your private personal data to a stranger passing by on the street? YES NO 4. Would you prefer a robot or a pilot to fly the EK A380? YES NO in a manifold enveloped by the gamebeyond individual choice>> Beyond individual sovereignty (choice set ) at a moment in time 1. As your dinner is served you are informed that it was prepared in a virtual restaurant off premises. 2. At you arrive in the operating theatre, the anaesthetist informs you that a virtual surgeon will operate on you. 3. Your private personal data is encrypted by a stranger passing by on the street. 4. As you take your seat for the long-haul flight you are reliably informed that a robot will fly the EK A380. Algorithmic pricing:

BIN price < END price Game: Al. Gorithm v Onsumer Note: A game of 16 moves but type is betrayed by the 6th move: 6/16 = 0.375 th Corollary: 4 move in a 10th-11th move sequence 1. If N players in non-zero sum game Elasticity falls ( < 1: inelastic) and prices rise < 1: inelastic) and prices rise Example: N =162 seats on each plane to destination x and 2 carriers 2. If N+1 players in zero-sum game Example: N Onsumers click to buy limited number of concert tickets with Al Gorithm Elasticity increases ( < 1: inelastic) and prices rise > 1: elastic) and net revenues rise

Tradable assets Monetization of FB, WhatsApp, Instagram, LinkedIn Hypothesis: With all the information available it makes who you are & what you do a tradable asset Online rational onsumer trades and exchanges personal data and personal search patterns at zero transactional cost. Al. Gorithm acquires the tradable asset at zero cost (no exchange value) but with a NPV that is infinite. Example: On average: FB makes $3 in EU and $13 in US per month from onsumer data patterns https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/11/03/how-much-money-does-facebookmake-from-you/

Al. Gorithm Behaviour Bounded Recall Aumann & Sorins bounded recall - if your repeat your behaviour many times then Al. Gorithm attaches a small probability Credible Threat Maximin & Regret ( < 1: inelastic) and prices riseFOMO: last seat left or 3 other people are looking at this hotel room rate package) Mimic behaviour requires data feedback as Pepper the Robot filters habits and routines as cumulatively unfolding processes so as to influence demand (smart strategy) Manifold behaviour embeds mutual interdependence between data and onsumer, action-reaction chain of events, and as onsumer gets closer to the transaction, in a moment in time, Al Gorithm resembles an onsumer 2019 Hypothesis

We already know that algorithms behind the software mimic behaviour requiring big data feedback (i) algorithms as players in an asymmetric game with online consumers onsumers (ii) the data patterns are cuboid pockets criss-crossing in a manifold => what if algorithms can be designed as players in an asymmetric game within a neotenic data pattern (spanning a manifold? Algorithm Design Significant research readings: read Christian & Griffiths (2017) Algorithms to Live By Pedro Domingos (2016) The MasterAlgorithm But what if algorithms can be designed (i) as players in an asymmetric game algorithm evolves to Al. Gorithm in 6 moves or less and morphs into a sufficiently intelligent algorithm with memory and emotions. (ii) a manifold of data patterns spans the playersstrategy sets.

(iii) within the manifold there is a nth-point equivalentto the NE point in the cuboid Euclidean space Reachable equilibrium in neotenic data patterns a stopping point (equilibrium) requires one player to have a dominant strategy. Two players: Al. Gorithm and Onsumer The equilibrium is defined as a reachable equilibrium Corollary: As END moves away from BIN and onsumer chases the BIN price, BIN increases and, at a moment in time, END is equivalent to BIN. END prices retains the neotenic patterns of BIN prices. Meso:data Neoteny in large data sets data points retain earlier data patterns. Memory+Emotions=Meso-Data Is the meso:data set bounded? Does it have a reachable equilibrium?

Two evolutionary forces at work: moving away v reacting or converging to Moving away affects the speed of observer behaviour, so reacting to is a secondary effect Is moving away (from BIN) equivalent to reacting to Al. Gorithm? No Is END moving away from BIN? Yes Is moving away equivalent to reacting? No Mimic or manifold patterns? Manifolds Reachable equilibrium: Emotional attachment Typical website has filters on price, ratings, reviews, and your choice set of [ABCDE] may be designed or ranked to CBA (ratings > 5, price < 175) if hidden information not known or if DE not considered?

=> 1. present bias cost 2. cognitive (opportunity) cost of evaluating alternatives 3. cognitive bias (oh, I cant believe the room is 90..then you extrapolate bad news: cant be a great room or early check-out or no breakfast!) 4. plan continuation bias: the Laurel & Hardy piano effect 5. procrastinating on final choice Reachable equilibrium: Emotional moving away attachment if present-bias onsumers are more likely to procrastinate BIN levels should fall if present-bias onsumers are less likely to procrastinate BIN levels should rise the inner field dilemma*: is BIN converging to END or is END moving away from BIN with BIN-like data patterns

=> neotenic data patterns is there a set of fairness criteria? fair algorithm? *as onsumer bid against themselves in the game Neotenic Data Patterns Emotions emotions as moving away emotional attachment 1. emotions as the linked memories : Texting and tweets and search patterns Deep learning attempts to mimic the activity in the brain as an Euclidean action-reaction sequence. 2. Philosophical: something representing something abstract (JL.Austin) Someone that could be someone else:Al. Gorithm You, the onsumer Al Gorithm has become You as a person with either a viewpoint that you share on social media or a search pattern that can be replicated 3. Mathematical: Mimic or manifold patterns? Neotenic data patterns with linked memories and emotional attachment attempts to understand the action-reaction order of the brain as a n-sphere space.

4. Reachability a thinkingequilibrium is the attachment at a moment in time in (A, B) of B moving away fromA. 5. Moving away with neotenic data patterns Dear Onsumer Your patterns are g8t. I am always with you of late. That's why we, Will always be, Digital Serf & Master.. Yours 466453.....Al. Gorithm Future Research A methodology for

earlier work on mesodata v deep learning. Corollary: both omega circles & manifold in pattern recognition If G1 no thinking and G2 with thinking, then G1 and G2 are equivalent if we can obtain by reflection one or more sub-games. The mirror test: has AL purchased what an onsumer would have independently selected? At a moment in time is

behaviour symmetric representing something abstract? The Empty Neotenic Price For any BIN price an entire rotation: BIN x number of onsumers Then we can find the manifold in the price data by using a manifold iso-map algorithm. The data patterns suggest a

revolving characteristic with END retaining neotenic patterns of BIN. At a moment in time Al. Gorithm becomes the onsumer. When data patterns are prioritised as things and a Nash equilibrium exists on each edge of a cuboid pocket of data things a thinking reachable equilibrium exists. The END price retains the neotenic pattern of a BIN price as onsumer bid against

themselves. BIN END BIN moving away The set U illustrates the set of BIN prices and the set V illustrates the set of END prices. The price pocket M is illustrated by the abstract manifold (saddle shape) containing the intersection of U and V. The shaded area in the

manifold is the final price as (higher) END mutates to (lower) BIN but remains at a higher END. The lower BIN is an empty price in the shaded area BIN Within END.. BIN END.. BIN END BIN moving away The set U illustrates the

set of BIN prices and the set V illustrates the set of END prices. The price pocket M is illustrated by the abstract manifold (saddle shape) containing the intersection of U and V. The shaded area in the manifold is the final price as (higher) END mutates to (lower) BIN but remains at a higher END.

The lower BIN is an empty price in the shaded area BIN..END.. BIN END.. Game Design..reachable stability: Texas shootoutstrategy Strategy as irrational reason if presented with an incredible threat. A thinks B will fight and B has reputation for fighting then A and B enter a Texas shootout: price hierarchy A undertakes a self-assessment of the threat from B, A signals a 50:50 alliance JV outcome and it is sustainable but the reachable outcome (no price war) is stable because the rule of the

alliance JV is to require each player to submit a bid (for the reachable payoff), after which the winner has to buy out the loser at the average of their two bids. Contract of Incredible Threat: Suppose the reachable equilibrium is worth 100m, B offers their half of the payoff for 30m. A must decide to accept or decline the bid. If A accepts, B pays 30m and the equilibrium collapses. If A declines, A must pay B 30m and B must accept, leaving B with $80m. Discipline not to Cheat: Alternatively, both players enter sealed bids indicating the minimum price to end the alliance JV and whichever sealed bid is the higher wins and buys the losers share at the price indicated in the losers sealed bid. Game Design..reachable thinking stability: Strategy as irrational reason if presented with an incredible threat from an abstract player thinking.

Contract of Incredible Threat: Suppose the reachable equilibrium is worth 100m, B offers their half of the payoff for 30m. A must decide to accept or decline the bid. If A accepts, B pays 30m and the equilibrium collapses. If A declines, A must pay B 30m and B must accept, leaving B with $80m. Discipline not to Cheat: Alternatively, both players enter sealed bids indicating the minimum price to end the alliance JV and whichever sealed bid is the higher wins and buys the losers share at the price indicated in the losers sealed bid. Abstract Player: Al. Gorithm as something abstract v onsumer as a player enters the game with BIN, rival player, Al. Gorithm sets the end move and END price, facilitating onsumer to play in the belief that BIN is reachable, only actionable as END BIN. Cuboid pockets of prices Cuboid pockets of BIN and END prices

detected, they frame the game forming crisscross patterns. At a reachable thinking equilibrium waves radiate outwards, waves intersect spanning a manifold with boundary. https://www.mdpi.com/ 1424-8220/19/1/178 The drifting of cuboids Each cuboid face h

as its blue coloured NE dot point floating in n-space towards a yellow coloured singleton point. Singleton point HUMAN = MACHINE The

reachable thinking equilibrium is embedded within the cuboids. https://blender.stackexc hange.com/questions/79 10/what-is-non-manifold -geometry Seek Not Thyself Outside Thyself Ne te quae siveris extra Ralph Emerson

Thank you for listening Habit is a great deadner Samuel Beckett Waiting for Godot Act II